Sustained invisibility through crowding and continuous flash suppression: a comparative review by Faivre, Nathan et al.
REVIEW ARTICLE
published: 27 May 2014
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00475
Sustained invisibility through crowding and continuous
ﬂash suppression: a comparative review
Nathan Faivre 1,2*,Vincent Berthet 3 and Sid Kouider 4
1 Division of Biology, Computation and Neural Systems, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA, USA
2 Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience, Brain Mind Institute, School of Life Sciences, École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland
3 University of Lorraine, InterPsy, Nancy, France
4 Laboratoire de Sciences Cognitives et Psycholinguistique, EHESS/CNRS/ENS-DEC, Paris, France
Edited by:





Guido Hesselmann, Charité Campus
Mitte, Germany
*Correspondence:
Nathan Faivre, Laboratory of Cognitive
Neuroscience, Brain Mind Institute,
School of Life Sciences, École
Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne,
AI 2201.2 (Bâtiment AI), Station 19,
CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland
e-mail: nathan.faivre@epﬂ.ch
The study of non-conscious vision beneﬁts from several alternative methods that allow
the suppression of an image from awareness. Here, we present and compare two of
them that are particularly well-suited for creating sustained periods of invisibility, namely
visual crowding and continuous ﬂash suppression (CFS). In visual crowding, a peripheral
image surrounded by similar ﬂankers becomes impossible to discriminate. In CFS, an image
presented to one eye becomes impossible to detect when rapidly changing patterns are
presented to the other eye. After discussing the experimental speciﬁcities of each method,
we give a comparative overview of the main empirical results derived from them, from the
mere analysis of low-level features to the extraction of semantic contents. We conclude
by proposing practical guidelines and future directions to obtain more quantitative and
systematic measures of non-conscious processes under prolonged stimulation.
Keywords: visual crowding, continuous flash suppression, unconscious processing, awareness, consciousness
INTRODUCTION
For long, the most prevalent method used to disrupt visual aware-
ness was masking, which consists in presenting a stimulus very
brieﬂy, in temporal contiguity with noise patterns (Breitmeyer
and Ogmen, 2006). Visual masking has been extremely fruitful
in describing both the architecture of the visual system and the
properties of non-conscious vision (Kouider and Dehaene, 2007).
Yet, as masked stimuli become visible when presented for longer
than a few 10s of milliseconds, masking is not well suited for the
investigation of cognitive functions requiring sustained stimula-
tion such as motion processing, perceptual learning, sequential
learning, visual search, temporal integration, etc.
In this review, we present and compare two techniques that,
contrary to masking, allow for prolonged stimulation while
maintaining a reliable control of awareness. The ﬁrst method,
visual crowding, makes a peripheral object surrounded by similar
ﬂankers impossible to discriminate, so that one cannot determine
consciously some of its speciﬁc features like its angular orienta-
tion, shape, or color (Levi, 2008; Pelli and Tillman, 2008; Whitney
and Levi, 2011). The second method, continuous ﬂash suppres-
sion (CFS), renders an object presented to one eye undetectable
when the other eye is ﬂashed with a stream of rapidly chang-
ing patterns, so that one cannot determine consciously whether
the stimulus is present or absent (Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005; for
reviews see Lin and He, 2009; Sterzer et al., 2014). A major distinc-
tion between crowding and CFS is at the phenomenological level:
while crowding prevents stimulus discriminability, CFS prevents
stimulus detectability (although situations of partial awareness
exist in CFS, see below). Hereafter, unless speciﬁed, “invisibil-
ity” refers to the absence of discrimination under crowding (i.e.,
one feature of interest is not consciously perceived, although the
presence vs. absence of the stimulus is detected), and to the absence
of detection under CFS (i.e., the presence vs. absence of one fea-
ture of interest or the whole stimulus is not detected). We focused
on CFS and crowding as they constitute, as of today, the two
most suited methods to study the temporal dynamics of conscious
vs. non-conscious vision. Although other methods can induce
long periods of invisibility, they are not suited for psychophys-
ical procedures (e.g., inattentional blindness, which is effective
for a few trials only), and they do not allow for a strict control
of stimulus duration (e.g., binocular rivalry or bistable ﬁgures,
in which visibility ﬂuctuates erratically over time; see Kim and
Blake, 2005 for a review). The phenomena of crowding and CFS
are driven by speciﬁc properties of the visual system and con-
stitute by themselves speciﬁc research questions. Only those that
are relevant for the ﬁeld of non-conscious vision will be covered
here, as our primary goal is to offer a description of how these two
methods contribute to the study of non-conscious perception, and
by extension to our understanding of the mechanisms underlying
consciousness. After discussing the speciﬁcities implied by both
methods in terms of experimental design and procedure, we give a
comparative overview of the main empirical results derived from
each of them. In light of this reviewing work, we propose cri-
teria for choosing one method over the other depending on the
research question at hand. In addition, we diagnose three kinds of
methodological limitations commonly found in empirical stud-
ies: the use of “all-or-none” experimental designs, the absence of
methodological comparisons, and the lack of systematicity when
estimating stimulus visibility. Accordingly, we propose tentative
guidelines to overcome those limitations and to evaluate, in amore
quantitative and systematic fashion, the nature of non-conscious
vision.
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HOW CFS AND CROWDING ARE USED?
CFS and crowding are of great relevance to study non-conscious
processes involving long-lasting stimuli. Although both meth-
ods can be used alternatively in this context, they are sup-
ported by different mechanisms, and are associated with dis-
tinct subjective experiences (see Figure 1). Contrary to crowd-
ing which is a natural phenomenon occurring during normal
vision, CFS has been developed explicitly as a tool to study
non-conscious processes. Therefore, the psychophysical prop-
erties of CFS are far less described than those of crowding.
Hence, the following description is based on both published
results and personal, undocumented observations which we
hope summarize the general opinion of researchers in the
ﬁeld.
HOW TO ARRANGE STIMULI?
As mentioned above, in CFS, the stimulus of interest is typi-
cally presented foveally and in isolation to the non-dominant eye,
while the dominant eye is ﬂashed with a series of salient patterns
called mondrians and changing every 100 ms. In order for sup-
pression to be reliable, the mondrians have to share a maximum
of featural similarities with the stimulus of interest, notably in
terms of shape, spatial frequency, or color (Hong and Blake, 2009;
Zadbood et al., 2011; Yang and Blake, 2012). Crowding involves
the binocular presentation of a peripheral stimulus surrounded
by similar ﬂankers. Importantly, crowding does not depend on
stimulus size (Tripathy and Cavanagh, 2002), which allows for
preventing awareness of relatively large stimuli (i.e., around 5◦ of
visual angle; to our knowledge, no study has systematically inves-
tigated this aspect with CFS). Typically, the eccentricity between
the center of the stimulus of interest and gaze location ranges from
5 to 20◦ of visual angle. According to an empirical law, the center-
to-center spacing between the stimulus of interest and its ﬂankers
must be inferior to half the eccentricity in order for crowding to
occur (Bouma, 1970). In addition, the degree of eccentricity and
critical spacing needed to induce crowding varies depending on
several factors such as the stimulus complexity (e.g., number and
density of features, see Bernard and Chung, 2011), and the similar-
ity between the stimulus of interest and its ﬂankers (e.g., in terms
of shape, see Kooi et al., 1994, or spatial frequency, see Chung
et al., 2001), as well as their spatial arrangement (Livne and Sagi,
2007, 2010; Saarela et al., 2009; Manassi et al., 2012). Even though
crowding applies to simple stimuli (van den Berg et al., 2007), one
can notice that the level of crowding necessary to reach chance-
level discrimination is usually obtained at smaller eccentricities for
multi-feature symbols (e.g., typically 5◦ for Chinese pictographs,
see Yeh et al., 2012) than for single feature stimuli (e.g., typically
20◦ for oriented lines, see Faivre and Kouider, 2011a)1. Accord-
ingly, the disruption of awareness for such simple stimuli might
involve not only crowding, but also unspeciﬁc mechanisms lead-
ing to signal loss at high eccentricities in the visual ﬁeld (e.g.,
decrease of attentional ampliﬁcation, decrease of photo-receptors
1Discrimination with ∼75% accuracy was obtained at low eccentricities for single
features like orientation (2.5◦ in Parkes et al., 2001), size, saturation, and hue (2–15◦
in van den Berg et al., 2007). Further research is needed in order to establish whether
crowding differs between single and multi-feature stimuli.
FIGURE 1 | Illustration of typical crowding and CFS displays.
(A) Schematic representation. In crowding, participants stare at a
ﬁxation cross (which here appears at the top of the screen), while a
stimulus of interest (here the letter S) is presented in the periphery of
the visual ﬁeld, surrounded by similar ﬂankers (here, the letters X). Note
that the display is constant across eyes. In CFS, the stimulus of
interest is usually presented foveally to the non-dominant eye, while the
dominant eye receives a stream of rapidly changing pattern called
mondrians. (B) Subjective percept. In crowding, observers report seeing
a jumbled array of letters in the periphery (i.e., discrimination, but not
detection is impeded). In CFS, observers typically report seeing only the
mondrians (i.e., both discrimination and detection are impeded).
(C) Distribution map. In crowding, eye ﬁxation (depicted here by a red
square) and attentional focus (depicted here by an orange area) are
always dissociated (i.e., endogenous attention), while they are usually
conjoint in CFS.
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in the peripheral retina, poor sensitivity in the high frequency
domain etc.). Note however, that such peripheral limitations can
be counter-balanced by scaling up stimuli, as the extent of crowd-
ing does not scale with stimulus size (Tripathy and Cavanagh,
2002). As opposed to crowding, the efﬁcacy of CFS does not seem
to correlate with stimulus complexity, which may qualify the latter
as a preferred method for preventing awareness of simple, single
feature stimuli like oriented lines, or color patches.
HOW LONG CAN WE KEEP IT INVISIBLE?
The duration of stimulation is a determinant factor in experimen-
tal designs for two main reasons. First, long-lasting stimulation
allows for studying the non-conscious processing of dynamic stim-
uli (e.g., motion, see below for empirical results). Second, it allows
for manipulating stimulus onset asynchronies (SOA) indepen-
dently of visibility, contrary to what happens during backward
masking in which an increase of SOA is usually associated with
an increase in visibility (Weisstein and Haber, 1965). Note that
longer is not necessarily better, as increasing stimulus duration
can have the consequence of inversing facilitatory priming effects
into inhibitory habituation effects for stimuli rendered invisible,
whether it is for crowding (Faivre and Kouider, 2011a) or for CFS
(Barbot and Kouider, 2012; Faivre and Koch, 2014a).
How sustained is invisibility under crowding and CFS?
Although no study investigated directly whether peripheral stimuli
could escape crowding after relatively long exposures (i.e., min-
utes), previous studies suggest that there is no upper limit (e.g.,
Kooi et al., 1994). Thus, in principle, one might be able to pre-
vent awareness for extended durations, as long as observers do not
stare directly at the stimulus. This last aspect requires oculomet-
ric control, and notably the use of a gaze-contingent display, in
which the stimulus of interest is replaced by a non-informative
pattern as soon as the observer stops staring at the ﬁxation cross.
We called the experimental procedure fulﬁlling this condition gaze
contingent crowding (GCC; Faivre and Kouider, 2011b; Kouider
et al., 2011). Compared to crowding, oculometric control in CFS
is far less developed, mostly due to the use of stereoscopes that
are usually not compatible with eye-tracking (but see Rothkirch
et al., 2012, for oculomotor correlates of non-conscious process-
ing under CFS). No study investigated systematically the maximal
duration of invisibility allowed by CFS. In their seminal study,
Tsuchiya and Koch (2005) noted that in around 15% of trials “no
part of the gray image was seen at all for the full 3-min trial.”
In general though, stimuli are known to break suppression after
several seconds of display. In fact, the time taken by a stimulus to
break suppression is now commonly used as a dependent variable
for inferring non-conscious processing [i.e., “breaking CFS,” see
Jiang et al., 2007; and the review by Gayet et al. (2014) and Stein
and Sterzer (2014) in the present volume].
HOW IMPORTANT IS ATTENTION?
Although the links between attention and consciousness are intri-
cate and complex (Lamme, 2003; Koch and Tsuchiya, 2007; Cohen
et al., 2012), there is now a general consensus that both conscious
and non-conscious processes are themselves inﬂuenced by atten-
tional mechanisms. For our purpose here, attention seems to plays
a dual role. First, attentional ampliﬁcation is known to decrease
the impact of crowding and thus to increase visibility (Yeshurun
and Rashal, 2010; to our knowledge no direct investigation of the
links between attention and the strength of suppression under
CFS has been performed). In addition, even without awareness,
non-conscious effects are of bigger amplitude when stimuli are
attended vs. unattended, both in crowding (Montaser-Kouhsari
andRajimehr, 2005; Faivre andKouider, 2011b) and inCFS (Kanai
et al., 2006; Bahrami et al., 2008; Kaunitz et al., 2011; see also the
Frontiers research topic dedicated to this issue by Tsuchiya and
van Boxtel, 2013). In CFS, the location of attentional focus is usu-
ally superimposed to the location of eye ﬁxation (but see Bahrami
et al., 2007; Hesselmann and Malach, 2011; Yuval-Greenberg and
Heeger, 2013 for notable exceptions). By contrast, in crowding, the
location of attentional focus is never superimposed to the location
of eye ﬁxation (e.g., observers stare at a ﬁxation point presented at
the top the screen,while endogenously attending to a stimulus pre-
sented at the bottom of the screen). Thus, in order to maximize
effects amplitudes, participants have to deploy their attentional
focus away from where they are staring at.
CAN WE CONTRAST VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE SITUATIONS AT
CONSTANT STIMULATION?
One crucial condition to isolate the neural correlates of visual
consciousness with a contrastive approach is to compare two
states of consciousness while the stimulation remains constant
(Baars,1998).When this condition is fulﬁlled, observeddifferences
between the two states of consciousness can hardly be argued to
reﬂect confounds in terms of signal strength. This condition is well
veriﬁed with ambiguous ﬁgures, binocular rivalry, or attentional
blink (see Kim and Blake, 2005 for a review). Some efforts have
been made to apply the same logic to visual masking: by reversing
the order of masks and blanks, a stimulus is either visible when
directly surrounded by blanks, or invisible when surrounded by
masks (e.g., Dehaene et al., 2001). Although this method provided
valuable results, one can still deplore that it only fulﬁlls the crite-
rion of constant stimulation at a global scale (i.e., when integrating
the signal over the whole trial duration), but not at a local scale
(i.e., the immediate context in which the stimulus is presented
changes between conditions). In crowding, one usually contrasts
visible and invisible conditions by manipulating the spacing or the
similarity between the stimulus of interest and its ﬂankers. This
manipulation does not fulﬁll the criterion of constant stimulation,
and therefore is not optimal in the context of a contrastive study
of consciousness. However, by relying on psychophysical thresh-
olding methods, it was shown that one can obtain conditions in
which a crowded feature (i.e., the tilt of an oriented line) can be
discriminated in some trials, but not in others, while thewhole dis-
play remains constant (Faivre and Kouider, 2011a). Future studies
are needed to assess whether such conditions can be obtained for
multi-feature stimuli (e.g., faces).
As we mentioned above, “breaking CFS” is a popular variant
of classical measures of after-effects (AE) which consists in mea-
suring the time it takes for a stimulus to emerge into awareness
despite suppression, and comparing possible differences between
experimental conditions (Gayet et al., 2014; Jiang et al., 2007).
Although this approach might potentially satisfy the criterion of
constant stimulation, it suffers from methodological ﬂaws, which
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are described in this volume [see the review by Stein and Sterzer
(2014) and Gayet et al. (2014) in this research topic, as well as
Stein et al., 2011]. Other studies have attempted to minimize the
difference in terms of stimulation between conscious and non-
conscious conditions, notably by presenting to the same eye the
stimulus of interest superimposed to the mondrians in the con-
scious condition (e.g., Harris et al., 2011). It appears that reaching
reliable perceptual changes at constant stimulation still requires
efforts, both for crowding and CFS. Only then those two meth-
ods could be used for a strict contrastive description of the neural
correlates of consciousness.
IS IT REALLY INVISIBLE?
Crowding-induced undiscriminability and CFS-induced unde-
tectability represent two qualitatively distinct perceptual impair-
ments. It implies that crowding and CFS stem from different
mechanisms that may be responsible for some of the speciﬁc
features we describe hereafter. Although the extent of crowding
varies depending on stimuli and participants, it is rather stable
over time, which insures the possibility of prolonged experimen-
tal sessions and therefore accurate measures (but see Chung, 2007;
Sun et al., 2010; Hussain et al., 2012 for learning effects during
crowding occurring across daily experimental sessions). In CFS,
a decrease of contrast detection thresholds after extensive train-
ing was recently documented (Ludwig et al., 2013). In addition,
we noticed that a small proportion of observers (∼5%) remain
partially or completely immune to CFS: in some cases, binocu-
lar fusion seems absent, so that the stimulus of interest appears
superimposed to the mondrians. In some other cases, suppression
appears to break after shorter and shorter durations over an exper-
imental session, which undermines the possibility of displaying
long-lasting stimuli without awareness (this applies speciﬁcally to
dynamic stimuli, see below). These observations are mainly based
on personal experience, and inter-individual differences remain
to be tested systematically for both methods. Likewise, no study
has directly compared the causes of discrimination vs. detection
impairments occurring respectively in crowding and CFS.
HOW ECOLOGICAL IS IT?
As any sensory organs, the visual system is tuned according to the
optical properties naturally present in the environment. Therefore,
the contrast between conscious and non-conscious vision may be
most accurate when performed in ecological conditions, which
mimic the natural environment. As noted above, crowding is a
natural phenomenon, occurring when exploring any visual scene
composed of multiple objects appearing in the periphery of the
visual ﬁeld. By contrast, one rarely faces two rival stimuli presented
to each eye, one of them being much more salient than the other as
it is the case in CFS. In the next section, we will assess whether the
apparent ecological superiority of crowding over CFS is reﬂected
in terms of empirical results.
LEVELS OF REPRESENTATION FOR NON-CONSCIOUS
CONTENTS
In this part, we present the main ﬁndings obtained for stimuli
rendered invisible with CFS and crowding, at different levels of
visual processing: single features, motion signals, multi-feature
objects (including faces), and semantic contents. By features, we
mean discrete components of an image that are detected inde-
pendently of each other (Suchow and Pelli, 2013). By semantic
content, we refer to the meaning conveyed by a physical signal.
We only review results that are based on indirect measures of
non-conscious processing, whereby a modulation of neural or
behavioral responsiveness follows the presentation of an invisi-
ble stimulus. Hence, we do not cover the literature based on the
“breaking CFS” technique, whose potential confounds in terms of
partial awareness are discussed in this research topic (see, Gayet
et al., 2014; Stein and Sterzer, 2014).
NON-CONSCIOUS PROCESSING OF SINGLE FEATURES
Low-level after-effects
Before the emergence of CFS about a decade ago, several studies
showed that simple features rendered invisible by binocular rivalry
produce speciﬁc sensory illusions called AE. The observation of
such AE is considered as a behavioral signature of non-conscious
processing, for simple features such as tilted lines (tilt AE, Wade
and Wenderoth, 1978), square-wave gratings (spatial frequency
AE,Blake and Fox, 1974),McCollough-type gratings (orientation-
contingent color AE, White et al., 1978), and translational motion
(motion AE, Lehmkuhle and Fox, 1975; O’Shea and Crassini,
1981).
Building upon those precursors, and under more reliable sup-
pression conditions (Tsuchiya et al., 2006), similar results were
foundunderCFS regarding tiltAE (Bahrami et al., 2008). Likewise,
crowded tilted lines are also known to induce tilt AE (He et al.,
1996), and priming (Montaser-Kouhsari and Rajimehr, 2005;
Faivre and Kouider, 2011a). Yet, spatial frequency and orientation-
contingent color AE remain to be tested under both CFS and
crowding.
Brightness is another low-level feature whose perception under
CFS has been studied using contextual illusions. On the one hand,
it was shown that the simultaneous brightness contrast illusion
(i.e., a gray circle appearing brighter against a dark background
than against a light background) persists even when the spatial
context inducing the illusion (the background region that sur-
rounded two physically identical target circles) was suppressed
from awareness by CFS (Harris et al., 2011). Yet, the same study
reported that the Kanizsa triangle illusion (i.e., the illusion of a
luminance contour induced by spatially distinct elements prompt-
ing the visual system to assume the presence of an occluding
surface) didnot persistwhen the inducer elementswere suppressed
from awareness2. These ﬁndings suggest that under CFS, the low-
level processes involved in brightness perception (e.g., background
luminance) can occur without awareness, while the higher-level
ones involved in the assignation of surface borders through per-
ceptual completion do not. Interestingly, positive evidence for the
Kanizsa triangle illusion was found when the inducer elements
were crowded (Lau and Cheung, 2012).
Over the years, a debate has emerged as to know whether low-
level AE such as the tilt AE are stronger when induced by visible
compared to invisible stimuli. He et al. (1996) ﬁrst suggested that
crowding had no inﬂuence on the amplitude of tilt AE induced
2See Wang et al. (2012) for positive results based on bCFS.
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by high-contrast gratings. On the other hand, it was shown that
both tilt and motion AE were smaller when low-contrast stimuli
were rendered invisible by binocular rivalry and crowding, com-
pared to a situation of full visibility (Blake et al., 2006). This study
further suggested that the independence between AE amplitudes
and visibility found previously might stem from a saturation of
the adaptive response at high stimulus contrast. Yet, a subsequent
study showed that when manipulating carefully attentional ampli-
ﬁcation, low-contrast stimuli could induce the same AE whether
crowded or not (Bi et al., 2009). Finally, evidence from fMRI indi-
cated that crowding had a detrimental effect on AE amplitude at
the level of V2/V3, but not at the level of V1 (where tilt AE are
supposed to stem from, see Fang and He, 2008). Taken together,
these results suggest that crowding may be seen as a bottleneck
impacting visual processes differently depending on their position
along the visual pathways.
If the independence between AE amplitude and crowding
remains debated, the evidence is clearer for CFS: the very ﬁrst
paper introducing CFS showed that it had a detrimental effect
on the amplitude of after-images (Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005), and
recent ﬁndings using fMRI strengthened this idea by showing that
CFS decreases the activity from signals as early as in the primary
visual cortex (Watanabe et al., 2011; Yuval-Greenberg and Heeger,
2013). Comparing these results with those of Fang and He (2008)
described above, one could deduce that crowding impacts visual
processes at later stages compared to CFS. However, considering
the high variability across experiments, we argue that clear con-
clusions should be drawn from systematic comparisons only (see
discussion).
NON-CONSCIOUS PROCESSING OF MOTION SIGNALS
As we mentioned in the introduction, CFS and crowding present
the advantage of maintaining stimuli out of awareness for poten-
tially long durations. So far, most studies that took advantage
of this property focused on motion processing, by measuring
motion AE from invisible stimuli. In CFS, translational motion
has ﬁrst been shown to induce motion AE that did not transfer
across eyes, suggesting that the underlying processes are quite low-
level (Maruya et al., 2008). Yet, with a slightly different setup, AE
induced by translational and spiral motion were found to transfer
across eyes, and to depend on attentional ampliﬁcation (Kaunitz
et al., 2011). Recently, AE from apparent and biological motions
(i.e., point-light walkers) were found under CFS (Faivre and Koch,
2014b). However, it was found that the extent of temporal inte-
gration was smaller under CFS than in condition of full visibility
(i.e., ∼100 ms vs. ∼1s for apparent motion, and ∼1 vs. ∼3s for
biological motion, respectively). Taken together, these results sug-
gest that motion processing is enabled under CFS at various levels
of complexity, but with restricted periods of temporal integra-
tion. Interestingly, it was also shown that the processing of implied
motion (i.e., static pictures depicting someone or something mov-
ing) was not enabled in the absence of awareness, suggesting that
CFS has a detrimental effect not only on temporal but also spatial
integrative processes (Faivre and Koch, 2014b).
Under crowding, translational motion is known to shift the
apparent location of a subsequent stimulus (Whitney, 2005;
Bressler and Whitney, 2006), while spiral motion (Aghdaee, 2005;
Aghdaee and Zandvakili, 2005) and apparent motion (Rajimehr
et al., 2004) also induce AE. In addition, crowded biological
motion in the form of dynamic facial expressions were found to
be processed despite crowding, notably through the dorsal visual
pathway (Faivre et al., 2012b, see below). It appears from these
ﬁndings that, as in CFS, motion processing at various levels of
complexity is enabled under crowding.
NON-CONSCIOUS PROCESSING OF MULTI-FEATURE OBJECTS
Face stimuli
Among all stimuli composed of multiple features, faces have
undoubtedly triggered the most interest in the ﬁeld of non-
conscious vision, including studies relying on CFS and crowding.
Beyond its obvious ecological value, a single face stimulus con-
veys multiple levels of information which allows for probing
non-conscious processing at several levels of complexity. Here,
we review the evidence for non-conscious face processing along
two axes: the representation of facial identity and the emotional
processing of facial expression.
Jiang and He (2006) were the ﬁrst to focus on face process-
ing under CFS with fMRI. They found that the fusiform face
area was more activated by fearful or neutral faces compared to
scramble faces. In addition, they found that the amygdala and
superior temporal sulcus were more activated by fearful com-
pared to neutral faces. Recently, it was found that this activation
in the superior temporal sulcus was only present in participants
with high negative affectivity (a dispositional trait relevant to
psychopathology, see Vizueta et al., 2012). A subsequent study
reported that category-speciﬁc responses inducedby invisible faces
vs. houses in fusiform and parahippocampal cortices can be only
obtained when using multivariate pattern analysis, rather than
univariate techniques, suggesting that the ﬁne-scale pattern of
activity within these areas encodes the features of invisible objects
(Sterzer et al., 2008). Building upon these fMRI studies, the same
research teams then focused on the electromagnetic correlates of
non-conscious face processing. Jiang et al. (2009) found electroen-
cephalographic responses to faces vs. scrambled faces in posterior
occipital areas (between 140 ms and 200 ms after stimulus onset,
arguably similar to the classical N170 component for face pro-
cessing), followed by responses to fearful vs. neutral faces along
superior temporal regions 220 ms after stimulus onset. Sterzer
et al. (2009) conﬁrmed the category-speciﬁcdifferences they found
with fMRI in a magnetoencephalographic study, by document-
ing an M170 component in response to invisible faces vs. houses
along the fusiform cortex. Taken together, these results based on
hemodynamic and electromagnetic correlates of neural activity
suggest that the signals conveying both face-speciﬁc information
(i.e., face vs. scramble or fearful vs. neutral face) and category-
speciﬁc information (i.e., face vs. house) are not abolished by
CFS.
At the behavioral level, the evidence for processing of facial
identity under CFS is less convincing. Using a method similar to
CFS, Moradi et al. (2005) ﬁrst attempted to measure identity AE,
that is a bias for the perception of a speciﬁc facial shape after the
observer is exposed to an adapting face that has opposite global
features (its“antiface”). They found that such identityAEoccurred
when the adapting face was visible, but completely vanished when
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it was invisible. Later, Stein and Sterzer (2011) reported that iden-
tity AE could actually be induced by invisible faces, though with
a reduced amplitude, and without interocular transfer (i.e., when
the adaptation face and the target are presented to different eyes),
suggesting that it probably stemmed from low-level processes.
Similarly, Barbot and Kouider (2012) found that the identity of
invisible faces induced repetition priming effects, but with no inte-
rocular transfer: participants were faster to categorize a target face
as famous when it was preceded by an invisible identical vs. dif-
ferent prime face presented to the same eye. As primes and targets
were of different sizes (i.e., 20% size difference), it was argued that
these priming effects genuinely reﬂected non-conscious process-
ing of facial identity. Yet, it was recently found that the similarity
between aprime and a target differing only in termsof size could be
captured as early as in the primary visual cortex, up to 70% of size
difference (Faivre and Koch, 2014a). This raises the possibility that
identity priming for faces reﬂects low-level overlap rather than the
activation of face representations per se. In addition, the existence
of identity repetition priming in conditions of complete unaware-
ness was recently challenged by a study reporting that priming
effects are indeed induced by faces whose identity is invisible, but
critically, only when lower level features like color or location are
visible (i.e., partial awareness, see Mudrik et al., 2013). We come
back to the issue of partial awareness in the discussion. Overall, the
behavioral evidence for the processing of facial identity remains
inconclusive.
Now regarding emotional processing under CFS, an inﬂu-
ential study ﬁrst reported that observers’ attention could be
attracted to or repelled from invisible erotic stimuli, depend-
ing on observer’s gender and sexual orientation (Jiang et al.,
2006). Later, it was shown that invisible adaptors depicting facial
expressions of anger, fearfulness and happiness could bias the
way a subsequent target face was perceived (i.e., facial expres-
sion AE, see Adams et al., 2010). Contrary to what was observed
for the processing of identity, these results cannot stem from
low-level retinotopic similarities, as adaptor and target stim-
uli were presented to opposite sides of the visual ﬁeld and to
different eyes. These two studies reinforced the idea of a “spe-
cial status” for emotional stimuli, as objects that are processed
without awareness notably along subcortical routes (Tamietto
and de Gelder, 2010). Yet, facial expression AE were subse-
quently dismissed on the basis that it probably stemmed from
residual visibility and attentional confounds (Yang et al., 2010;
see Adams et al., 2011 for a response). Supporting this idea,
another study showed that aftereffects from gender and race infor-
mation were absent under strict control of awareness (Amihai
et al., 2011). New elements to this debate were recently added
by two studies, in which invisible fearful faces were found to
change skin-conductance responses, both in the context of fear
conditioning (Raio et al., 2012) and preference judgments (Lap-
ate et al., 2013). In addition, preference judgments biases were
found to be induced by angry – but not happy – faces ren-
dered invisible by CFS (Almeida et al., 2013, but see Faivre et al.,
2012a for negative results under masking and CFS; de Zilva
et al., 2013 for negative results about the mere exposure effect
under CFS). We can conclude from this group of recent studies
that unlike facial identity, facial expressions rendered invisible
by CFS elicit responses that can be captured at the behavioral
level3.
Under crowding, Faivre and Kouider (2011b) showed rep-
etition priming of facial identity when the prime and target
were presented 15◦ away from each other, suggesting that unlike
what was shown for CFS (Barbot and Kouider, 2012), identity
processing under crowding does not depend on retinotopic sim-
ilarity. Furthermore, we showed that crowded facial expressions
can bias subsequent affective judgments of neutral pictographs
(happy faces elicited more pleasant judgments than angry faces,
see Kouider et al., 2011). Moreover, the preference bias induced
by crowding faces was not only induced by static (i.e., pictures)
but also by dynamic (i.e., videos) facial expressions. Using fMRI
coupled with univariate analysis, it was found that compared
to a neutral face, static happy faces activated primarily the ven-
tral visual pathway including the fusiform face area, which was
functionally connected to the amygdala (Faivre et al., 2012b). By
contrast, dynamic happy faces triggered the dorsal visual path-
way (including the posterior parietal cortex) and the substantia
innominata, a structure contiguous with the dorsal amygdala. To
our knowledge, no multivariate pattern analysis has been applied
to try to decode the content of crowded stimuli. Along the same
lines, it was shown that crowded emotional faces could inﬂuence a
conscious judgment (assessing the average emotion resulting of six
ﬂanker faces and one target crowded face) while the same inverted
and scrambled faces could not (Haberman and Whitney, 2007,
2009). Like our results, this ﬁnding shows that despite preventing
object recognition, crowding does not impede the processing of
emotional information extracted from objects.
Tool stimuli and the dorsal visual stream
Besides faces, the processing of tools under CFS has also received
much attention. Using fMRI, Fang and He (2005) ﬁrst revealed
that suppressed pictures of tools speciﬁcally activate the dor-
sal visual pathway, which is thought to support the guidance
of actions (Goodale and Milner, 1992). At the behavioral level,
it was shown that suppressed pictures of tools – but not of
non-manipulable objects like animals – could facilitate the cat-
egorization of subsequent targets (i.e., categorical priming, see
Almeida et al., 2008, 2010), suggesting that non-conscious pro-
cessing in the dorsal – but not ventral – visual pathway can be
used for recognizing manipulable objects. Recently, this ﬁnding
was challenged by a study revealing that similar priming effects
could actually be induced by any kind of elongated objects, rather
than speciﬁcally manipulable objects (Hebart and Hesselmann,
2012; Sakuraba et al., 2012). As the previous priming effects
may stem from such low-level confounds, the level of process-
ing undergone by invisible tool stimuli remains unclear. Relying
on multivariate analysis of blood-oxygen-level dependent signal,
Hesselmann and Malach (2011) showed that features from invis-
ible tools were encoded in the lateral occipital cortex, which rules
3Interestingly, much more positive results were found using the breaking CFS
method (Jiang et al., 2007; Yang et al., 2007; Tsuchiya et al., 2009; Zhou et al., 2010;
Stein et al., 2012, 2013; Stewart et al., 2012; Gray et al., 2013). These results and the
apparent discrepancy with the ones we reviewed are discussed in this research topic
(see Gayet et al., 2014; Stein and Sterzer, 2014).
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out the possibility that stimulus energy was so low that all high-
level processes were abolished. Most importantly, they also found
that CFS equally reduced brain activity in the ventral and dorsal
visual pathways, which challenges the original claim that CFS has
no or little inﬂuence on the dorsal visual pathway (Almeida et al.,
2008). The claim that CFS disrupts the ventral but not the dor-
sal visual pathway is further debated, as one study documented
the capacity to grasp visually suppressed stimuli (Roseboom and
Arnold, 2011, but see Ludwig et al., 2013; see also the comment
on the study by Roseboom and Arnold, 2011 from the same
authors).
Regarding crowding, although several lines of evidence suggest
that multi-feature objects like arrows (Faivre and Kouider, 2011b),
sequences of geometric shapes (Atas et al., 2013), or naturalistic
objects (Fischer and Whitney, 2011) are processed in the absence
of conscious discrimination, no study has investigated directly
the processing of crowded tools. Yet, it was found that crowding
decreases to the same extent the spatial resolution of both visually
guided reaching and perception, suggesting that it impacts both
the ventral and thedorsal visual pathways (Bulakowski et al., 2009).
NON-CONSCIOUS PROCESSING AT THE SEMANTIC LEVEL
As of today, it remains unclear whether stimuli rendered invisi-
ble by CFS can be processed up to the semantic level. Combining
the semantic-priming procedure with binocular rivalry, Zimba
and Blake (1983) ﬁrst presented prime words to an eye during
either dominance or suppression phases of binocular rivalry. A
semantic-priming effect (here on response times in a lexical deci-
sion task) was observed only when prime words were presented
during dominance phases, suggesting that semantic processing is
disabled during suppression phases.
Kang et al. (2011) extended this work by combining the
semantic-priming procedure with CFS, and using the N400
component of human event-related potentials (ERPs) as an elec-
trophysiological index of semantic processing. Here, an invisible
target word (e.g., apple) was preceded by a semantically related
(e.g., orange) vs. unrelated (e.g., doctor) prime word. Although
target words usually elicit N400 components of smaller ampli-
tudes when preceded by semantically related vs. unrelated primes,
no such modulation was observed when the target was rendered
invisible byCFS.As in binocular rivalry, this result lead the authors
to conclude that semantic processing of words was disabled under
CFS (but see Heyman and Moors, 2012, for possible theoretical
and methodological issues).
Contradicting this negative result, it was recently shown that
complex – rather than single – semantic stimuli (e.g., multiple-
wordphrases, basic equations) rendered invisible byCFS for longer
durations (i.e., up to 2 s) can still be processed (Sklar et al., 2012).
For instance, the result of an invisible equation (e.g., 9 – 3 – 4 = )
was found to facilitate the response to a subsequent target num-
ber congruent to the equation’s solution. This suggests that the
equation had been non-consciously solved by the time the target
appeared. In line with this study, Zabelina et al. (2013) investi-
gated the semantic processing of triplets of words under CFS. In
each trial, participants had to solve a compound remote associate
problem, that is ﬁnding a word (e.g., apple) common to three
seemingly unrelatedwords thatwere suppressed for seconds before
being fully visible (e.g., pine, crab, sauce). Participants solved
word problems faster following suppressed problem words than
following suppressed irrelevant words. Interestingly, this priming
effect was observed only when participants reached the solution
by analysis rather than by insight, which led the authors to sug-
gest that semantic processing but not semantic integration of the
word triads occurred non-consciously. Here, however, since there
was no physical difference between primes and targets (i.e., the
task was performed once the triplet words became visible), prim-
ing may have stemmed from a perceptual rather than semantic
facilitation. Indeed, participants may have processed the triplet
words at a perceptual but not semantic level, which nevertheless
would facilitate responses on the triplet words when they become
visible.
In the same vein, using a setting in which participants heard a
verbal label before performing a simple detection task wherein
stimuli were pictures of familiar objects rendered invisible by
CFS, Lupyan and Ward (2013) found that valid labels (words
semantically related to the object) improved performance while
invalid labels decreased performance. Yet, they also reported
that the effectiveness of labels varied as a function of the match
between the shape of the stimulus and the shape denoted by
the label, suggesting that labels facilitated the perceptual pro-
cessing of the suppressed objects rather than their semantic
processing4.
Finally, two studies have investigated whether crowded stim-
uli can be processed at the semantic level. Yeh et al. (2012)
showed that crowded single-character Chinese words were able
to induce behavioral semantic-priming effects in a lexical deci-
sion task, with an effect amplitude similar to those induced by
visible Chinese words. Recently, Peng et al. (2013) combined the
semantic-priming paradigm with crowding while recording ERPs.
As in theCFS studybyKang et al. (2011)described above, crowding
was applied to target rather than prime words. Here, participants
were required to judge whether the prime and target words were
semantically related or not. Semantic priming was reﬂected both
in terms of reaction times and in the amplitude of the N400 com-
ponent, although effects were of smaller amplitudes for crowded
compared to uncrowded targets. However, one should note that
the discriminability of crowded targets was slightly above chance-
level, which questions the non-conscious origin of these effects.
Interestingly though, the authors report that long-lasting presen-
tation of crowded targets is required in order to observe semantic
priming, which suggests that sustained invisibility is beneﬁcial
when probing high-level processes.
SUMMARY: WHAT CAN BE SAID OVERALL?
We here summarize what emerges from the sum of empirical
results describing the depth of non-conscious processing under
crowding and CFS over the last decade. First, as a tool to study
non-conscious vision, it appears that the use of CFS is much
more widespread than that of crowding (i.e., we numbered 50
vs. 21 studies addressing directly non-conscious processing with
4As in for what we noted regarding face processing,muchmore evidence of semantic
processing was obtained using bCFS (Jiang et al., 2007; Costello et al., 2009; Mudrik
et al., 2011; Yang and Yeh, 2011; Sklar et al., 2012).
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CFS vs. crowding). Overall, there is strong behavioral evidence for
the processing of simple stimuli under both CFS and crowding,
including luminance and contrast (CFS:Harris et al., 2011; crowd-
ing: Lau and Cheung, 2012), orientation (CFS: Bahrami et al.,
2008; crowding: He et al., 1996; Faivre and Kouider, 2011b), and
motion (CFS: e.g., Maruya et al., 2008; Kaunitz et al., 2011; Faivre
and Koch, 2014b; crowding: e.g., Rajimehr et al., 2004; Whitney,
2005). Efforts remain to be made regarding the respective impact
of crowding and CFS on the amplitude of such low-level processes
(e.g., size of AE). Regarding multi-feature objects, the literature on
CFS is rather controversial. As of today, no compelling behavioral
evidence supports the processing of facial identity (e.g., Moradi
et al., 2005; Stein and Sterzer, 2011), even though signals conveying
facial identitymay be detectable at the neural level, especially when
using more subtle analyses such as multivariate pattern classiﬁca-
tion (Sterzer et al., 2008). By contrast, emotional stimuli like facial
expressions seem to trigger both behavioral and neural responses
(e.g., Adams et al., 2010). This discrepancy between the processing
of facial identity and facial expressions suggests that the latter may
beprocessed along subcortical routes that arenot fully disruptedby
CFS (Tamietto anddeGelder, 2010). One can conclude that behav-
ioral measures (i.e., priming, AE) may not be suited for detecting
the weak traces left by complex stimuli rendered invisible by CFS.
Yet, physiologicalmeasures like skin conductance, electromagnetic
or hemodynamic responses (associated with multivariate analysis)
seem to indicate that CFS does not abolish the processing of com-
plex stimuli such as faces (facial expressions, see Raio et al., 2012
or facial identity, see Sterzer et al., 2008) or tools (Hesselmann and
Malach, 2011). Similarly, two studies (Sklar et al., 2012; Zabelina
et al., 2013) seem to indicate that the processing of combination of
words or numbers are processed up to the semantic level, although
potential low-level confounds remain to be ruled out.
Compared to CFS, the literature on crowding is more limited,
but also more consistent: all studies we found report positive
behavioral results for the encoding of crowded multi-feature
objects, including symbols, facial identity (Faivre and Kouider,
2011b), and facial expressions (Kouider et al., 2011), up to the
extraction of semantic information (Yeh et al., 2012; Peng et al.,
2013; although full indiscriminability of crowded stimuli is not
always warranted, see above). It is unfortunate that compared to
CFS, the neural basis of non-conscious processing under crowding
remains largely uncovered (see Chicherov et al., 2014 for a recent
study on the neural correlate of crowding).
From low-level features to semantic content, looking exclusively
at the positive results we reviewed would lead to the conclusion
that virtually any kind of visual process is enabled under crowd-
ing or CFS. One could derive from this observation that stimulus
awareness has no functional role during visual processing (e.g.,
Hassin, 2013). Yet, a large portion of the results we reviewed
are far from being unequivocal. Indeed, the literature on each
speciﬁc topic often includes conditions of residual awareness, neg-
ative ﬁndings which are difﬁcult to interpret, replication failures
which most likely exist but remain undocumented, or inadequate
conclusions due to experimental confounds (e.g., arguing for the
processing of tools vs. elongated objects, or for semantic rather
than perceptual processing, see above). Hence, this heteroge-
neous set of studies makes the whole picture of non-conscious
vision under crowding and CFS difﬁcult to interpret. Below, we
discuss some potential reasons for this difﬁculty, and humbly pro-
pose tentative guidelines to manage this tremendously challenging
task.
Is one better than the other?
Tables 1 and2 summarizewhat canbe said regarding the respective
advantages of crowding vs. CFS. Considering the lack of systematic
methodological comparison, the criteria for choosing one or the
other method mostly pertain to practical considerations. As men-
tioned in the introduction, if one’s aim is to study the processing
of simple stimuli in the complete absence of awareness (e.g., an
oriented line remaining undetectable), CFS would most likely do
the trick. Crowding, on the other hand, is not as potent with single
feature stimuli, and only impedes stimulus discrimination. Yet, if
one’s aim is to measure the processing of complex objects in a
natural environment (e.g., under conditions of virtual reality, see
Table 1 | Summary of the comparison of crowding and CFS on different psychophysical features.
Crowding Continuous flash suppression
Stimulation Binocular, peripheral Monocular, foveal
Maximal duration Unlimited? ∼30s
Visibility impairment Discrimination Detection
Adjustable parameters Eccentricity, ﬂankers, contrast Mondrians, contrast
Subjective change at constant stimulation Only for tilted lines Only with bCFS
Conditions of partial awareness Not documented Location, form, color
Sensitivity to attentional ampliﬁcation Yes Yes
Efﬁcacy for dynamic stimuli Good Good
Efﬁcacy for faces Good Good
Efﬁcacy for single features Poor Good
Robustness across subjects Good Fair
Compatibility with physiological measures Good Good
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Table 2 | Summary of the comparison of crowding and CFS on the level of evidence regarding non-conscious processing of various contents.
Crowding Continuous flash suppression
Single features
Tilt AE Good, decrease of AE amplitude debated Good, decrease of AE amplitude






Fair (results are mixed at the behavioral level)
Good
Tools Lack of studies Fair (potential low-level confounds)
Semantic Fair (few studies, potential visibility confounds) Fair (potential perceptual confounds)
Pizzi et al., 2012), crowding seems like a valuable alternative to
CFS.
The main advantage of both crowding and CFS over the arse-
nal of techniques available in the ﬁeld (Kim and Blake, 2005)
is the possibility for sustained invisibility: a stimulus can be
presented for several seconds, either in the form of a static
picture or dynamic movie, while the observer accesses none
or some of its features (see above). This improvement opens
many research questions: how do conscious vs. non-conscious
processes unfold over time? Can temporal structures spread
over long durations be integrated into unique representations?
For what kind of processing is sustained invisibility beneﬁ-
cial? One obvious case is the processing of dynamic stimuli
(e.g., motion). Another one is the processing of long-lasting
stimuli inducing neural fatigue (e.g., inducing tilt AE). Dis-
playing static stimuli for long durations is known to potentially
overstimulate the visual system, and transform facilitatory into
inhibitory effects (see Faivre and Kouider, 2011a; Barbot and
Kouider, 2012). Besides this phenomenon, several studies inves-
tigating high-level cognitive processes mentioned the beneﬁt of
using long-lasting static stimuli (i.e., several hundred of mil-
liseconds up to 3 s) as it gives them the time necessary for
elaborate processing. For instance Bahrami et al. (2010) had
invisible gabor patches conveying numerosity information pre-
sented for durations up to 3 s. Sklar et al. (2012) had sentences
and equations suppressed from awareness for up to 2 s. It
would be interesting to test whether such non-conscious pro-
cesses under crowding and CFS are enabled when shorter stimuli
are used. In crowding, Peng et al. (2013) explicitly mentioned
the presence of semantic priming when crowded words were
presented for 1 s but not 350 ms. This is at odds with the
numerous results showing that processing of words or digits
presented for a few 10s of milliseconds are enabled despite
masking (see Kouider and Dehaene, 2007 for a review). In
those conditions, determining what is left to crowding and CFS
compared to masking or other techniques requires systematic
comparisons.
CROWDING AND CFS: WHAT’S NEXT?
Altogether, the numerous studies reviewed above provide a rather
unclear and incomplete picture of the nature of non-conscious
vision under crowding and CFS. This, in our opinion, is due to
threemainmethodological limitations (see alsoYang et al., current
issue, for a standardized approach in CFS).
The ﬁrst methodological limitation is that most studies rely on
“all-or-none” designs, whereby only the presence vs. the absence
of an non-conscious process is assessed. If enabled, this pro-
cess typically gives rise to a measurable effect (e.g., priming,
AE, changes of neural activity, etc.), while if it is disabled, a
null effect is observed. Such null effects can be hardly inter-
pretable, and are in fact rarely published, giving rise to a bias
in the literature on non-conscious vision (i.e., ﬁle drawer effect,
see Rosenthal, 1979). Thus, rather than “all-or-none” designs,
we argue that the ﬁeld would beneﬁt from the use of paramet-
ric designs. First, parametrization can be applied to the stimulus
visibility, in order to compare a process at distinct levels of aware-
ness (e.g., with different degrees of crowding or CFS). This allows
for estimating quantitatively the role of stimulus visibility for a
given process in terms of effects’ amplitude (e.g., the amplitude
of tilt and motion AE at various levels of crowding and binoc-
ular rivalry, see Blake et al., 2006), effects’ dynamics (e.g., the
time it takes for an effect to arise over the experimental session)
or effects’ robustness (e.g., how sensitive an effect is to atten-
tional manipulations). Secondly, parametrization can be applied
to the stimulus complexity, in order to compare conscious and
non-conscious processes at distinct levels of representation (e.g.,
probing facial identity and expression with the same stimuli). In
this context, the observation of a null effect obtained at one level
of representation may be conﬁrmed by the presence of a pos-
itive effect showing that the stimulus is nevertheless processed
at a lower level of representation (e.g., evidence for lexical but
not semantic processing). Accordingly, one would be able to esti-
mate the impact of crowding and CFS at distinct levels along
the visual pathways for a single stimulus, as it was tentatively
done in binocular rivalry (Nguyen et al., 2003). Not only this
strategy would help probing the limits of non-conscious vision
more systematically, but also lead to a better understanding of
the mechanisms at the origin of invisibility under crowding and
CFS.
The second methodological limitation is that most studies
usuallymeasure non-conscious processing relying on a single tech-
nique to prevent stimulus awareness (but see Blake et al., 2006;
Almeida et al., 2008, 2013; Kanai et al., 2010; Faivre et al., 2012a;
Stein et al., 2013, for examples of studies measuring a process
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under different techniques). Considering that each study uses
different experimental setups (i.e., in terms of stimulus set, hard-
ware, indirectmeasure of processing, etc.), it is difﬁcult to conclude
about the superiority of one technique over the other. Yet, if one
wants todescribe the limits of non-conscious vision, onehas todis-
entangle what can be attributed to the method employed to render
the stimulus invisible (i.e., stimulus duration, contrast, position
in the visual ﬁeld, etc.) and the limits attributed to the nature
of non-conscious processing per se. This may require performing
studies at larger scales, in which the dependencies between one
speciﬁc process and visual awareness are assessed with a set of
complementary methods and a single stimulus set.
The third methodological limitation concerns measures of
stimulus awareness. Although some efforts are made at the theo-
retical level to reach a consensus regarding a deﬁnition for stimulus
awareness (e.g., Seth et al., 2008; Sandberg et al., 2010), most
studies diverge in their use of visibility measures. Objective mea-
sures include detection tasks (i.e., determinate if the stimulus is
present or not), discrimination tasks (i.e., recognize a stimulus
from its scrambled version), or categorization tasks (i.e., distin-
guish two stimuli from different categories). Invisibility is usually
taken as granted from chance-level performance in any of these
measures. Yet, each of them clearly implies a different deﬁnition
of invisibility. For instance, performance on a detection task in a
crowding experiment would be clearly above chance, as only the
discriminability of a crowded stimulus is impaired (Levi, 2008).
Moreover, long periods of partial awareness are described under
CFS, in which observers have access to speciﬁc features of a stim-
ulus like its color or location, but not others like its orientation
(Hong and Blake, 2009; Zadbood et al., 2011). In this situation,
observers are likely to perform at chance-level in one but not
the other objective visibility task. The lack of consistency in the
assessment of stimulus awareness is particularly problematic con-
sidering that these situations of partial awareness are known to
potentially drive supposedly non-conscious effects (Kouider and
Dupoux, 2004; Kouider et al., 2010; Mudrik et al., 2013). In order
to reﬁne the level of awareness associated with one or the other
technique, objective measures may be used in synergy with sub-
jective ones using either continuous (e.g., Sergent and Dehaene,
2004) or discrete scales (Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004). Finally,
each measure may be performed at the single trial level, in order
to account for training or fatigue effects5. This is particularly rele-
vant in case stimuli are presented for long periods of time during
which awareness may ﬂuctuate.
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